The SNMP Management Framework
The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major components:
o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2571 [1] .
o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in STD 16, RFC 1155 [2] , STD 16, RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4] . The second version, called SMIv2, is described in STD 58, RFC 2578 [5] , RFC 2579 [6] and RFC 2580 [7] .
o Message protocols for transferring management information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1 and described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [8] . A second version of the SNMP Woundy Informational [Page 2] message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [9] and RFC 1906 [10] . The third version of the message protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10] , RFC 2572 [11] and RFC 2574 [12] .
o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [8] . A second set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [13] .
o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2573 [14] and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 2575 [15] .
A more detailed introduction to the current SNMP Management Framework can be found in RFC 2570 [24] .
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI.
This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB.
Glossary
The terms in this document are derived either from normal cable system usage, or from the documents associated with the Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification process.
Authorization key
A key used to derive a key encryption key (used to encrypt TEKs), and to derive message authentication keys. When the CMTS communicates the authorization key to the CM, it encrypts the authorization key using the RSA public key of the CM [22] . 
BPI -Baseline Privacy Interface
A term referring to the DOCSIS specification [18] for enabling simple data privacy in the DOCSIS 1.0 system. Management of the BPI is the focus of this document.
BPI+ -Baseline Privacy Plus Interface
A term referring to the DOCSIS specification [21] for enabling CM authentication and data privacy in the DOCSIS 1.1 system. Management of the BPI+ is not addressed in this document.
CATV
Originally "Community Antenna Television", now used to refer to any cable or hybrid fiber and cable system used to deliver video signals to a community.
CM -Cable Modem
A CM acts as a "slave" station in a DOCSIS compliant cable data system.
CMTS -Cable Modem Termination System
A generic term covering a cable bridge or cable router in a head-end. A CMTS acts as the master station in a DOCSIS compliant cable data system. It is the only station that transmits downstream, and it controls the scheduling of upstream transmissions by its associated CMs.
DOCSIS
"Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications". A term referring to the ITU-T J.112 Annex B standard for cable modem systems [19] .
Downstream
The direction from the head-end towards the subscriber.
Head-end
The origination point in most cable systems of the subscriber video signals. Generally also the location of the CMTS equipment. 2.12. RF Radio Frequency.
SID
Service ID. The SID identifies a particular upstream bandwidth allocation and class-of-service management for DOCSIS, and identifies a particular bidirectional security association for BPI.
TEK -Traffic Encryption Key
Traffic Encryption Key, which is used for DES encryption of upstream and downstream traffic. When the CMTS communicates the TEK to the CM, it encrypts the TEK using the key encryption key derived from the authorization key.
Upstream
The direction from the subscriber towards the head-end.
Overview
This MIB provides a set of objects required for the management of the Baseline Privacy Interface for DOCSIS compliant Cable Modems (CMs) and Cable Modem Termination Systems (CMTSs). This MIB specification is derived from the DOCSIS Baseline Privacy Interface specification [18] , which is an extension to the DOCSIS Radio Frequency Interface specification [19] .
Please note that this MIB specification is not sufficient for the management of the DOCSIS Baseline Privacy Plus Interface specification [21] . The working group expects to issue a MIB for the management of BPI+ at a later time.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [23] . 
Management requirements
The Baseline Privacy Interface specification is documented in [18] , and is an extension to the Radio Frequency Interface specification documented in [19] . In addition to the explicit requirements in this specification, the CM and CMTS enabled for Baseline Privacy MUST support all applicable DOCSIS and IETF requirements and MIB objects. Specifications that identify relevant requirements and MIB objects include the IETF Radio Frequency MIB [16] , the IETF Cable Device MIB [17] , and the DOCSIS OSSI Specification [20] . 
Textual convention
CableLabs has required the implementation of prior versions of this MIB in DOCSIS 1.0 cable modems that implement the Baseline Privacy Interface, as a prerequisite for DOCSIS 1.0 certification.
The Baseline Privacy Interface MIB contains eight MIB objects defined with the (now obsolete) DisplayString textual convention, and one MIB object defined with the (now undesirable) IpAddress textual convention.
In the judgment of the working group, it is preferable to keep these less-than-desirable textual conventions, in order to maintain backward compatibility and interoperability with DOCSIS (2) causes the CMTS to invalidate the current CM authorization key, but not to transmit an Authorization Invalid message nor to invalidate unicast TEKs. Setting this object to sendAuthInvalid(3) causes the CMTS to invalidate the current CM authorization key, and to transmit an Authorization Invalid message to the CM, but not to invalidate unicast TEKs. Setting this object to invalidateTeks(4) causes the CMTS to invalidate the current CM authorization key, to transmit an Authorization Invalid message to the CM, and to invalidate all unicast TEKs associated with this CM authorization. Reading this object returns the most-recently-set value of this object, or returns noResetRequested (1) read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The value of this object is the lifetime, in seconds, the CMTS assigns to keys for this TEK association." REFERENCE "DOCSIS Baseline Privacy Interface Specification, Section 4.2.1.5 and Appendix A. This MIB specification contains a number of read-write objects, that should be protected from unauthorized modification to prevent denial of service and theft of service attacks: in particular, objects that reset state machines (ex. docsBpiCmAuthReset), change key lifetimes (ex. docsBpiCmtsDefaultAuthLifetime), change rekeying grace times (ex. docsBpiCmtsDefaultAuthGraceTime), and control multicast traffic (ex. most objects in the docsBpiMulticastControl group).
The desired means to protect these objects from unwarranted access is to implement the security features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use of the User-based Security Model [12] and the View-based Access Control Model [15] is recommended.
Weaker methods to protect CMs from unauthorized access include using the docsDevNmAccessTable from the Cable Device MIB [17] to disallow configuration changes from unauthorized network management stations, and using the SNMP MIB Object and SNMP Write-Access Control configuration file options from the Radio Frequency Interface [19] to set MIB object values and disable SNMP SET operations at cable modem boot time. Note that these mechanisms may be vulnerable to an unauthorized network management station "spoofing" the source address of a legitimate network management station.
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